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Abstract 
In this paper we investigate if directors of Australian companies earn persistent profits on their reported 
trades, if these abnormal profits are significant enough to be mimicked by outsiders, and if these insider 
trades have an effect on returns of other investors. We find that insiders take advantage of their private 
information in stocks of larger corporations, but generally do not in medium and small capitalization 
firms, indicating that they insiders are attracted to the liquidity and a greater presence of uninformed 
traders in large stocks. Insiders appear able to determine the value of their information in by trading 
larger volume and larger portion of their holdings when they have access to valuable information. We 
find that outsiders can make profitable trades by following insider’s trades in large firms, but abnormal 
returns mimicking insiders in small and medium size firms are limited to insiders’ sell trades only, and 
otherwise result in losses for outsiders. Implications on market fairness and integrity are discussed and 
conclude that market quality can be improved with public access to good quality aggregated data on 
reported director insider trades. 
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1. Introduction 
To assess the importance of insider trading in the Australian market, we investigate if directors 
earn profits on their reported insider trades, how they time these trades, and what the 
determinants of such trades are. Using the exact publication dates of these trades we assess 
whether outsiders are able to profit on this information. By presenting a comprehensive up-to-
date analysis of insider trading profitability in Australia, this paper aims to provide fact based 
policy recommendation for how current insider trading regulation may be further improved. 
Insider trading is well covered in the earlier literature, which generally focuses on the value 
of information contained in insider transactions. The literature typically differentiates between 
publicly reported insider trades and prosecuted illegal insider trades (Rogoff, 1964, Seyhun, 
1986, Rozeff and Zaman, 1988, Meulbroek, 1992, Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Early studies 
for Jaffe (1974) and Finnerty (1976) found significant abnormal returns on insider trades and 
suggested that these can be profitably imitated, which was later refuted by Seyhun (1986). 
Recent important contributions to the literature are Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who report 
global evidence that insider trading is a significant cost to outsider investors, Jeng, Metrick and 
Zechkhauser (2003) who find that the returns earned by insiders themselves are significant, 
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) who show in detail how directors outperform in their trading, and 
Cohen, Malloy and Pomorski (2012) who finds that focusing on non-routine “opportunistic” 
insider trades yield value-weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while 
abnormal returns associated with routine insider trades are essentially zero. 
In Australia Tomasic and Pentony (1991), Lyon and Du Plessis (2005) and several 
international law reviews of insider trading regulation, analyse insider trading from the legal 
perspective. Papers that investigate insider trading in Australia from the capital market 
perspective are Brown, Foo and Watson (2003), Hodgson and van Praag (2006), Uylangco, 
Easton and Faff (2010), McInish, Frino and Sensenbrenner (2011), Aspris, Foley and Frino 
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(2014) and Chang and Watson (2015). Results directly reporting performance of shares after 
insider rading are presented in the three of these papers. For data from 1996 to 2000, 1996-
2003,and 2005 to 2007 respectively, Brown et.al (2003), Hodgson and van Praag (2006) and 
Uylangco, Easton and Faff (2010) show that insider directors’ trades are followed by 
significant returns in the magnitude of 4% per annum, which in international context indicate 
that insider trading profits are at the expected level also in Australia (see our comparison across 
the literature in Table 7).  
Recently the insider trading literature has gained momentum as a result of access to new 
datasets or innovations in methodology. Using detailed data from Nasdaq OMX in Finland 
Berkman, Koch and Westerholm, (2015a) find significant mean abnormal returns when 
corporate directors trade, either as an insider in their own company’s stock, or as an outsider 
in other stocks. Important for our study they show that director trades contain information, and 
the degree of importance is dependent on how well the director is connected. 
Mehta, Reeb, Zhao (2014) show US regulations prohibit a firm’s employees from exploiting 
their private information about the firm and mandate that senior executives report their trades 
in their firm. Private information, however, often exhibits spillover effects and implications for 
a firm’s customers, suppliers, and competitors labelled shadow trading. Important for our study 
they show that significant insider information often is conducted outside of the regulated 
channels of director trading. 
Cukurova (2014) estimates what outside (non executive) directors learn around annual 
meetings using evidence from public SEC filings of insider trades in the USA. She shows that 
a significant proportion of price relevant information is released before the annual meetings 
through executive director trades, while all information revealed through outside director trades 
occurs after the annual meetings. For our purpose this is an important result showing how 
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public records of director trades contain significant information, particularly once non-routine 
trades by executive directors are isolated. 
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) expand the literature to consider inside information of 
activist shareholders and show that inside information is hard to detect in transaction data as 
informed traders enter when the market is more liquid and use limit orders. They conclude that, 
when informed traders can select when and how to trade, standard measures of adverse 
selection may fail to capture the presence of informed trading. These results are important to 
our study as they show that insider trading tends to be focused to more liquid periods and 
securities when the insider has a strategic choice. 
In this paper we investigate reported insider trades by corporate directors and entities of 
their direct influence and interest. This study aims to first verify previously observed returns 
following insider trades using comprehensive dataset from Australia for a relatively long period 
2005 to 2015, and a relatively wide range of stocks (2094) compared to most previous studies. 
The sample also identifies discretionary trades from routine trades. Second we investigate if 
the reported legal insider trading by directors has a negative impact on the return of outside 
investors, and third we discuss if the current extent of the publication of insider trading is 
sufficient to deter abuse of inside information, and to give corresponding policy 
recommendations. We find that insiders take advantage of their private information in stocks 
of larger corporations. We find that outsiders can make profitable trades by following all 
insider’s trades in large firms, but only by following insider sales in medium and small firms. 
A calendar-portfolio analysis shows that the insider buy portfolio outperforms before 
controlling for common risk factors; the average returns are positive and significant at 1% level 
across all stocks as well as different size groups. However, risk adjusted returns, alphas, are 
negative and significant suggesting that insider buy portfolio does not outperform across all 
stocks and different size groups when we take into account compensation for risk factors. 
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There are some specific differences in the Australian data compared to international results. 
The results in this paper contributes to the literature by showing that in modern markets, with 
significantly lower transaction costs, insider profits are still significant, and appear possible to 
imitate. Hence inside information is incorporated into prices of Australian equities with a delay. 
The outcomes presented in this paper emphasise that reported legal insider trading action 
has a significant impact on returns, and that investors and money managers need to pay close 
attention to the actions of corporate directors, particularly in larger firms where insider activity 
may be harder to detect. The results indicate that current Australian securities law and 
regulation is sufficient as insider directors generally report their trades on a timely basis, and 
also almost without exception conduct their trading outside of the windows when they are not 
allowed to trade. These findings also show that publicly reported insider trading can be better 
incorporated into investors’ decision making as the information they disseminate is not 
instantly incorporated into prices, permitting those who pay attention to benefit from this 
information. Hence the current regulation of legal insider trading is appropriate, but the main 
policy recommendation of this study is that the reporting of these trades should be made more 
easily accessible in a well structured public database. In the United States for example such 
data is available directly from the SEC and aggregated in easily retrievable form by commercial 
data providers. This research required extensive cleaning and compilation of the current pdf 
records of insider trades to conduct an analysis of the aggregated results. At present it is not 
expected that many market participants have the resources so keep up to date records of 
cumulative insider trading activity in the Australian market. One off exchange announcements 
in isolation do not provide much information without a the context of previous actions of all 
insiders of the stock. There are however several competing considerations with suggesting 
publicly available insider trading data such as the protection of the privacy of insiders vs. the 
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hypothesised improvement in price discovery. At present the regulator can access the required 
information as the need arises, for example upon detection of suspicious activity, hence the 
regulator is able to deter illegal activity. This does not however mean that the information 
content in insider trades is reflected in prices without delay. As long as information about legal 
insider trading is difficult to track, this information is bound to be incorporate into prices very 
slowly. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the unique data set from the ASX. 
Section 3 provides the results for profitability of insider trading for insiders. Section 4 presents 
the determinants of insider’s abnormal returns. Section 5 discusses the outsider’s abnormal 
profits, and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data  
2.1. Data on Insider Transactions and institutional background 
In Australia shareholders that are classified as insiders (corporate directors, corporations 
where the director has an interest, director controlled trusts and immediate family members) 
are required to lodge a “Change in Director Interest Notice” or Appendix 3Y, with the ASX 
within 10 working days of a trade in securities or options of the firms where they are a director.1 
The directors are requested to report the following items (but do not always provide complete 
details): the trade date (report date is known from the date and reference number of each report), 
company trading code, the intentions of the trade, whether the interest is direct or indirect, 
initial, acquired, disposed and post-trade holdings are also reported. We hand collect this data 
                                                            
1 In Australia the term “insider” refers to directors under the Corporations Act (2001), where a director is defined 
in Section 9. As pointed out by Chang and Watson (2015) endnote 1 page 1, “the definition differs from the use 
of the term in the US where it includes officers, executives and large shareholders. In Australia, large shareholders 
are known as substantial shareholders and they report changes in their shareholdings separately.” 
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using a procedure of machine reading the reports and manually verifying the correctness of the 
data. The items we require for a complete observation are trade date, report date, company 
trading code, insider ID, and volumes of purchase and sale of the insider trade. In this paper 
we include only insider transactions that are discretionary trades by the insider. This means 
that we do not include transactions related to purchase plans, dividend reinvestments plans, 
issues of performance rights, trades where shares are bought at a discount (option exercises) or 
sold at a premium (company buy backs). The sample initially consists of 31,344 trade 
transactions in 2094 different Australian firms during the period of December 8, 2005 to 
February 12, 2015. It includes trade date, report date, and volume of purchases and sales for all 
reported net transactions where an insider trades shares of her own firm. 
We run the following filtering procedure to ensure our empirical procedure gives us reliable 
results: 
1- We aggregate observations with same stock, same insider, same trade date and type of 
transactions. 
2- We delete duplicate observations for an insider during the same day. 
3- We delete buy transactions for same stocks, same dates but different insiders. The 
reason is that their purchase is very likely to be motivated by award system of the firm 
rather than insider information. 
4- We delete transactions with less than 100 shares traded. 
This filtering procedure leaves 21,387 transactions for our empirical tests. 
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2.2. Market Data 
We obtain daily data on share trading (VWAP2, share volume, dollar volume, time-weighted 
dollar spread, average trade size, buyer-initiated and seller initiated trade volume) from 
Australian Equities databases. We collect monthly total shares outstanding from Share Price 
and Price Relative (SPPR) databases. Both of these databases are provided by Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). These data sets are then merged with the 
Insider data set. Since we focus on daily returns and the insider records do not contain trades 
that are offset within the same trading day, using VWAP as the trade price is sufficient. We 
check if a stock has at least 50 non-missing price data 200 days prior to the trade date, at least 
50 non-missing price data 200 days after the trade date, and no missing price data on the trade 
date. If an observation does not comply with these requirements, we exclude it from the sample. 
The sample now contains 19,710 insider-price data observations after applying this 
requirement. 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the characteristics of the director insider trading sample by 
market capitalisation of the insider firms. The first to the fourth columns in Table 1 presents 
descriptive statistics for director insider transactions in all, large, medium and small firms based 
on their market capitalisation. In order to classify the firms into different size categories, we 
rank all stocks at the beginning of the sample period, and assign the stocks into three size 
groups with an equal number of representative firms. 
The average market capitalisation for the large, medium and small firm categories are 1.99, 
0.45 and 0.0098 billion dollars, respectively. There is a total of 2,094 firms in the sample which 
represents roughly two-third of all Australian listed shares. The total number of open market 
                                                            
2Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) is calculated as follows, where i denotes the trade and n is the total 
number of trades in the day: 𝑉𝑊𝐴𝑃 = ∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖
𝑛
𝑖−1
. SIRCA reports this ratio for all stocks in its Australian 
Equities database. 
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purchases and sales by insiders is 21,387 for the complete sample and 8,504, 6,992 and 5,891 
for large, medium and small firms, respectively, suggesting that the number on inside 
transaction is higher in larger stocks.  
The ratio of insiders’ purchases to sales is 1.6 for all, 0.75 for large, 1.69 for medium and 
2.64 for small firms. These buy to sell ratios indicate (except for large stocks) that when insiders 
trade, they tend to buy more frequently than they sell, and the frequency of buys to sells 
decreases with the size of the firm. Interestingly, insiders in large firms sell more than they 
buy, possibly indicating more liquidity driven trading in large firms.3  
We finally analyse the proportion of days with insider trades and the clustering of insider 
trades in the second part of Table 1. The proportion of insider trades to all trades in all stocks 
is 0.58%, with 0.47%, 0.73% and 0.64% in large, medium and small stocks, respectively. The 
results in Table 1 show that while insider trades are quite equally dispersed across time and in 
stocks, there are clear periods of higher concentration of director trades that analysts will wish 
to focus on. While some stocks experience a large number of insider trades, the average number 
of days per stock per year that insider trades is 3.1 days, and the number of trades each such 
day is 6.25.  
 
3. Profitability of Insider Trading 
In this section, we investigate whether the insiders earn significant abnormal profits on trades 
in their own firm stock. We analyse trading performance using two approaches: an event study 
approach and a portfolio calendar approach. 
 
 
                                                            
3 The sample include only discretionary non-routine trades by directors. 
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3.1. Event study approach 
For each date with insider trades, we first allocate a firm to a buy or a sell portfolio based on 
the imbalance in trading volume by insiders. If the volume of buy (sell) transactions exceeds 
the volume of sale (buy) transactions on that day, the firm is assigned to buy (sell) portfolio. 
Insiders who buy as many shares as they sell are ignored. Then, we calculate the daily abnormal 
returns (ARs) for each stock in each size group as the actual daily returns minus the equally 
weighted return cross all stocks in the same size group (excluding the stock in the interest).  
In order to investigate the performance of insiders after they trade their firm shares, we 
compute the cumulative average of abnormal returns (CAARs) for each insider over different 
short-term and long-term horizons, and then calculate the mean and median of these averages 
across all insiders.  The t-statistics are based on the standard deviation of the average CAARs 
across all insiders. The short-term horizons are between day 1 to 5 (1,5), day 1 to 10 (1,10) and 
day 1 to 20 (1,20) after the trade date. The long-term horizons are between day 1 to 60 (1,60), 
day 1 to 120 (1,120), and day 1 to 250 (1,250) after the trade date. Table 2 reports mean, 
median, t-statistics and the number of insiders with at least one trade for buy and sale 
transactions and overall sample that includes both buy and sale trades across different size 
groups. 
Table 2, panel A reports the results for all firms in the sample. Number of buy inside 
transactions (N=1,983) is greater than the number of sell transactions (N=951) across all firms. 
The mean CARs for buy transactions in short run is significant: the insiders accumulate 0.55% 
(t-statistics=2.43) after one week. However, their returns decrease over the longer horizons and 
they incur significant loss of 2.39% (t-statistics=2.87) after three months and 5.1% (t-
statistics=1.91) after one year. The short-term significant abnormal return subsequent to 
insiders’ purchases can be due to the market reacting to the good news implicit in insiders’ 
purchases. In contrast, following their sell trades and over the short-term, the mean CAR is 
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insignificant. Over the long-run CAR grows to -2.57% (t-statistics=2.7) after 3 weeks, -8.15% 
(t-statistics=-6.92) after 3 months, and -9.96% (t-statistics=-4.52) after 6 months. Insiders 
accumulate 11.42% (t-statistics=-1.84) after one year following their sell trade. Note that 
negative daily abnormal returns for sale transactions are imply positive returns for insiders as 
they show abnormal stock price declines following insider’s sales.  
We expect that if insiders buy (sell) stock prior to an announcement of favourable 
(unfavourable) information, then insider’s purchases (sales) will be followed by positive 
(negative) abnormal returns. The results in table 2 indicate that insiders underperform after 
they purchase and outperform after they sell. This suggests that insiders tend to buy after 
announcing good news, but tend to sell their shares before unfavourable information about their 
firm becomes public. The mean CARs for overall sample that contains both buy and sale 
transactions decreases over time, and they are insignificant over all horizons. 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative average of abnormal returns (CAARs) over 199 days before 
and up to 300 days after each event day for insider trades, separately for buy and sell portfolios. 
Panels A and B of Figure 1 demonstrate how the stock price declines for purchases and rise for 
sales after the insider trade date, confirming our previous results that insiders underperform 
(outperform) after their purchase (sale).  
We expect that if insiders refrain from buying (selling) share until after unfavourable 
(favourable) information is announced, then insiders’ purchases (sales) will be preceded by 
negative (positive) abnormal returns. Figure 1, panels A and B show that before the insider 
trade date, the stock price declines for purchases and rises for sales. This is consistent with the 
intuition that insiders tend to refrain from buying stock until after the bad news about their firm 
becomes public, and from selling stock until after good news is announced. 
Table 2, panel B reports the cumulative returns for small market capitalisation firms. For 
insider buys, the mean CARs are insignificant in the short run. They decrease over the time 
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and become significantly negative in the long-run. Insiders in small firms incur loss of -2.25% 
(t-statistics=-2.69), 7.38% (t-statistics=-5.09) and 17.41% (t-statistics=-3.02) after 3 weeks, 3 
months, and one year, respectively. In contrast, for sell transactions, insiders accumulate 
abnormal returns of -5.4% (t-statistics=-2.41), and -16.31% (t-statistics=-5.89), -15.3% (t-
statistics=-2.32) after 3 weeks, 3 and 6 months, respectively.  
The results in Table2, panel B, indicates that insiders tend to purchase after revealing good 
news, but tend to sell their shares before unfavourable information about their firm becomes 
public. The mean CARs for the overall sample is small in magnitude and significance over the 
short-term. However, they are significantly negative (both economically and statistically) 3 
weeks, 3 and 12 months after the trade. The performance of insiders after their trade is very 
similar in panels A and B, indicating that results in Panel A is driven by small firms dominant 
in the Australian market. 
Table 2, panel C reports the results for the medium market capitalisation firms. Following 
buy transactions, the mean CARs are significant in the short run, but decrease over time and 
become insignificant in the long run. An insider in a medium size firm on average accumulates 
0.91% (t-statistics=3.09) and 0.86% (t-statistics=2.04) after one and two weeks, respectively. 
However, they incur a significant loss of -3.74% (t-statistics=-2.04) after 6 months. The short-
term outperformance can be attributed to the good news implicit in insider’s purchase. Long-
tern loss indicates that insiders tend to purchase after revealing good news about their firm.  
For sell transactions, the mean CARs decrease over time suggesting an increasing 
cumulative abnormal returns for the insider, but they only become significant after 3 months (-
6.22% and t-statistics=-2.38) and 6 months (-10.21% and t-statistics=-2.46). This is similar to 
what we find for small firms where insiders make increasing abnormal profit in the long run, 
but not in the short term after they sell their own firm shares. This support the intution that 
insiders in medium size firms, like small forms, tend to sell their shares before revealing 
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unfavourable information about their firm. The mean CARs for overall sample that contains 
both buy and sale transactions are insignificant, economically and statistically, in the short- and 
long-term for the medium size firms. 
Table 2, panel D reports the results for insider transactions in large firms. Insiders in large firms 
accumulate increasing significant abnormal returns over time in both short- and long-run after 
their sell and buy transactions. For buy transaction, the insider accumulates 0.7% (t-
statistics=3.28) abnormal returns one week after the trade and it grows to 1.9% (t-
statistics=1.77) after three weeks. The mean CARs are 2.47% (t-statistics=2.00) and 2.34% (t-
statistics=1.92) after 3 and 6 months, respectively, following the insider’s purchase. These 
results are different to results for small and medium stocks for which the mean CARs is 
decreasing over time and insignificant and even negative in the long-run. The results suggests 
that insiders in large firms tend to buy before announcing good news to the public. 
For sell transactions, mean CARs are decreasing and significant over the time suggesting 
that there is increasing positive abnormal returns for the insider following their sell 
transactions. The mean CARs is -0.87% (t-statistics=-3.75) after a week and they grow to -
2.39% (t-statistics=-5.51), -5% (t-statistics=-4.89), -11.44% (t-statistics=-4.66) after 3 weeks, 
3 months and one year following the transaction day, respectively. These results indicates that 
insiders tend to sell before announcing bad news. The results for the overall sample that 
includes all buy and sale transactions across large stocks show that insiders accumulate an 
increasing abnormal returns over time in their inside transactions. Their mean CARs changes 
from 0.64% (t-statistics=3.66) over one week to 5.19% (t-statistics=1.9) after one year 
following their transaction date. 
The results for large firms are consistent to findings in prior research on insider trading 
(Seyhun, 1986; Jaffe, 1974; Jeng et al., 2003; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001 and Ravina and 
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Sapienza, 2010), in which there is abnormal returns for insiders after their buy and sale 
transactions.  
In summary, the results in Table 2 show that insiders in large firms make abnormal profits 
in buying and selling their firm’s shares over the short- and long-term. Insiders in small firms 
earn abnormal returns only in their sell transactions and after one month following their trade. 
Insiders do not profit from buy transactions in small firms. Insiders in medium size firms 
accumulate abnormal returns in their buy transactions up to 2 weeks (short-term), and in their 
sell transactions after 3 months (long-term) following their trade. This finding suggests that 
insiders in larger firms often take advantage of their private information more often compared 
to those in smaller firms in the Australian market. The possible explanation is that large firms 
have a larger proportion of uninformed traders or traders with liquidity needs that can act as 
counterparties to the insiders. In smaller and less liquid firms the insiders dominate the market 
and they are not able to profit as much from their information advantage.  
 
3.2. Calendar time portfolio approach 
In this section, we analyse the performance of insiders using a calendar time portfolio approach. 
At the beginning of each month, we allocate each stock into the insider buy (sale) portfolio if 
insiders for the particular stock are net buyer (seller) of that stock over the previous three 
months. We exclude the stock if the volume of buys and sales are equal. This allocation results 
in two portfolios based on insider trades over previous three calendar months. We keep the 
portfolios for one month and rebalance at the beginning of the next month. We calculate the 
equally weighted portfolio returns in each month for each portfolio. We compute portfolio time 
series average returns to analyse the monthly performance of these portfolios. We also estimate 
portfolio alphas, as the proxy for risk-adjusted insiders’ performance, based on the Fama–
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French three-factor model and the Carhart (1997) four factor model. The results are tabulated 
in Table 3.  
Panel A of Table 3 shows that the insider buy portfolio outperforms before controlling for 
common risk factors; the average returns are positive and significant at 1% level across all 
stocks as well as different size groups. However, risk adjusted returns, alphas, are negative and 
significant suggesting that insider buy portfolio does not outperform across all stocks and 
different size groups when we take into account compensation for risk factors. For example, 
the monthly Fama-French alpha (panel A, column 2) for all stocks in the sample is 28 basis 
points per month (t-statistics=-24.34). This average monthly underperformance corresponds to  
a loss of 3.4 percent per annum.  
In contrast, the insider sale portfolio in panel B has significant negative monthly alphas across 
all stocks and different size groups, suggesting that the insider sale portfolio outperform after 
controlling for risk factors. The risk adjusted monthly returns, alpha, across all stocks for the 
sale portfolio (Panel B, column 2) is -33 basis points (t-statistics= 5.13) which is close to the 
monthly alphas for the insider buy portfolio (i.e., -28 basis points).  
 
4. Determinants of Insiders’ Abnormal Profits 
In this section, we investigate the source of insider’s abnormal returns after they trade their 
own firms’ stocks. We define CARs over the short-term period of 1 to 10 days (1,10) and 1 to 
120 days (1-120), as the dependent variable in a set of regressions to examine if a group of 
independent variables can explain the abnormal returns for insiders. CARs are calculated for 
overall sample that includes both buys and sales. We use an OLS regression with fixed effects 
for insiders and firms. The independent variables are dummy variables for sales transactions, 
S, and the natural log of the daily close price, Log V, dollar volume of insider trading (defined 
as the product of VWAP and volume of shares traded by the insider) Log TV, and portion of 
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shares of the firms traded by insiders, Log PV. All the variables have been used in prior 
literature on insider trading to examine the determinants of superior predictive ability of 
insiders. (e.g. Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986).  
Table 4-panel A reports the results of the regressions when the dependent variable is the 
cumulative daily average abnormal returns (CARs) over the window of (1,10) days after the 
insider trading day. There are six different regression models based on dependent variables 
employed in the regression. Model 1 in Table 4-panel A shows the regression estimation of 
CARs over 10 days after the trade on dummy variable for sales transactions. The slope of the 
dummy variables is positive and significant for small size group. This provides evidence that 
insiders in small firms cannot forecast future abnormal stock prices movements. They purchase 
stock prior to abnormal price falls and sell stock before abnormal price rises, indicating that 
they incur loss in their buy-sell transactions in short- and long-term. This is consistent with our 
results in Table 2, panel B (last column) that shows negative abnormal returns for insiders over 
the window of (1-10) and (1-120) days following their trade. 
Model 2 in table3-panel A presents the results for the regression of CARs on the natural log of 
the daily close price of the firm. The results indicate that share price is negatively related to 
insiders’ abnormal profit across all stocks as well as different size groups. 
Model 3 in table 4-panel A reports the results for the estimation of the regression of CARs on 
the natural log of the dollar value of insider trades. The estimates for small stocks are positive 
(0.004) and significant (t-statistics=1.94) indicating that insider abnormal returns increase with 
the log of the dollar value of the transactions.  
Model 4 in table 4-panel A uses the natural log of the proportion of the shares of the firm 
traded by insiders. The results indicate a positive relation between the insiders’ abnormal 
returns and the log of proportion of the firm traded in both small and large firms. Models 3 and 
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4 suggest that insiders trade larger dollar volume (in small firms) or higher percentage of shares 
(in both small and large firms) to exploit more valuable information. 
Model 5 uses the natural log of the dollar value of insider trades and the natural log of stock 
price as explanatory variables. The coefficient of the dollar value of trading becomes 
significantly positive for large stocks and stronger for small stocks, while the coefficient of 
share price remains significantly negative. Including frim size increases the significance of the 
dollar value of trading, indicating that insiders respond to more valuable information by trading 
a greater dollar volume of stock. 
Model 6 provides the results of the regression of CARs on the natural log of the proportion 
of the firm traded and log of firm size. Once again, the proportion of the firm traded is positively 
related to insider’s abnormal returns, while firm size is negatively related to insider’s abnormal 
profits in both large and small stocks. 
Panel B, in table 4 provides the results for the determinants of the insider abnormal returns over 
the long term i.e. 120 days after they trade. The estimates in panel B is stronger than those in 
panel A. The slope of the sale dummy variable (Model 1) is positive and significant for all size 
groups, providing evidence that insiders in all firms cannot forecast future abnormal stock 
prices movements in the long-run.   
Model 2 in table 4-panel B shows that share price is negatively related to insiders’ abnormal 
profit across all stocks as well as different size groups over the long run. This is similar to our 
findings in panel A. 
The coefficients for trade volume and proportion of shares traded in models 5 and 6 are 
significantly positive after controlling for the stock price across all stocks and different size 
groups. The exception is for the medium size stocks, where the proportion of trade is 
insignificant even after controlling for price. This finding suggests that insiders respond to 
18 
 
 
more valuable information by trading greater dollar volume of stock or higher proportion of 
their share. 
The results in panel A and B are summarized as follows. First, there is a significant negative 
relationship between insider abnormal returns and firm equity price. This suggests that the most 
profitable insider trades occur in low value firms. Second, insiders appear able to determine 
the value of their information in the long-run by trading a larger volume of stocks or larger 
portion of their shares when they have access to valuable information. 
 
5. Outsiders’ Abnormal Profits 
In this section, we examine the availability of abnormal returns to outsiders following the day 
that insider reports their trades to the ASX. This is also the date that insider trades become 
publicly available. According to the legislation in Australia, insiders must report their trade 
within 10 days after their transaction. 
We compute the total number of inside transactions for overall sample categorised by the 
number of calendar days between the insider trading day and the report date (i.e. number of 
days insiders delay to submit their reports). Then we investigate the extent that insiders in 
Australia follow the legislation and how much they earn during the time that their trades have 
not yet been public. 
Table 5 presents the results for firms in different market capitalisation categories. The results 
show that most of insiders report their transactions (about 60% of total transactions) less than 
3 days after they trade. More than 90% of transactions in each size group are reported in the 
first week following the trade, suggesting that information about the majority of insider trades 
in Australia becomes public in a week. 
Table 6 reports the cumulative daily average abnormal returns over different time frames 
after insider trades become public. This is the cumulative returns for outsiders if they follow 
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insider trades, i.e. they buy (sell) following the news about insider purchase (sell) becomes 
available.  
The results for buy transactions of outsiders in panels A, B and C of Table 6, show that 
outsiders incur loss if they follow insider’s purchase in all firms (panel A) as well as small 
(panel B) and medium (panel C) size group firms in short- and long-term. However, for large 
stocks, they earn from 1.02% (t-statistics=1.84) 2 weeks following their trade up to 1.88% (t-
statistics=1.78) and 2.32 % (t-statistics=1.82) 3 and 6 months, respectively, after they purchase 
stocks. 
The results for sale transactions across all stocks and size groups (panels A, B and C in 
Table 6) show that outsiders make profit over all window periods after they sell following 
public announcement of insider’s sale. However, the abnormal return after a year for small and 
medium size stocks is statistically insignificant.   
The results over all transactions (buy and sell) for small stocks (panel B, Table 6) show that 
there is a loss for outsiders after 3 and 12 months if they follow insider’s transactions in small 
firms. However, outsiders who follow insiders in large stocks earn an increasing abnormal 
return from 0.29% (t-statistics=1.79) after a week up to 5.3% (t-statistics=1.91) after one year 
following the insider report date.  
In summary, outsiders can make profitable trades by following insider’s trades in large 
firms, but the abnormal returns of doing transactions following insiders in small and medium 
size firms are limited to insider’s sale trades.  
Results in Table 2 (gain for insiders) and Table 6 (gain for outsiders) are not readily 
comparable across all window periods except for the period of 1 to five (1,5) days. The reason 
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is that most of the insiders report their trade in the first week after their trade. Therefore, the 
abnormal returns for insider over later periods include the abnormal returns for outsiders.4  
Comparing Tables 2 and 5 for the period of one to five days reveals interesting results. Table 
1, panel A shows that while the insider earns abnormal return one week after their purchase, 
outsider gets nothing over a week if she follows the insider. This is vice versa for the sale 
transactions. While insider’s abnormal return one week after their sale is insignificantly 
different from zero, it is significant for outsiders: they earn 1.09% (t-statistics=-2.71) one week 
after their transaction. But the results over all transactions (last column in panels A of Tables 
2 and 5) show that neither insider nor outsider earn profit one week after their transactions.  
However, the results for large stocks indicate that both outsiders and insiders profit one 
week following their buy and sale transactions. The results for buys and sales (last column, 
Panel D, Table 2 and 5) show that insiders’ abnormal return is higher, statically and 
economically, than that of outsiders. Insider’s accumulated abnormal return after one week is 
0.64% (t-statistics=3.66), while the profit for outsiders is 0.29% (t-statistics=1.79) after one 
week. Ten days following the insider’s trade, the accumulated abnormal return is 1.05 % for 
both insiders (Table 2) and outsiders (Table 6), suggesting that over this period, the inside 
information is available to all market participants.  
 
6. Contrasting our results to previous studies and policy recommendation 
Seyhun (1986) finds that insider trading profits are not significant after transaction costs in 
the US, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) conclude that, when informed traders can select when 
and how to trade, standard measures of adverse selection may fail to capture the presence of 
informed trading. Meanwhile previous studies as well as the present one shows that in Australia 
                                                            
4 Note that we have used VWAP as a proxy for trade price for both insiders and outsider. 
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insider trades do contain significant information that is reflected in prices with a delay. Table 
7 indicates that the profits of insider trade lies persistently at just above 4% for large stocks, 
while they may be significant and large on insider sales in medium and small capitalisation 
stocks. With more accessible reporting we predict that the information contained in director 
insider trades would be more quickly reflected in prices, markets would become more efficient, 
and the currently highly significant autocorrelation in prices in most markets including 
Australia, would decrease or disappear. This may however come at the cost of the privacy of 
individuals with insider status coupled with costs of maintaining a public database of 
aggregated insider transactions, and there are limits to how much normative prescriptions the 
regulator can and should put in corporate executives. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate if directors of Australian companies earn persistent profits on their 
insider trades and if these abnormal profits are significant enough to be mimicked by outsiders. 
We find that insiders take advantage of their private information in stocks of larger 
corporations. We find that outsiders can make profitable trades by following all insider’s trades 
in large firms, but only by following insider sales in medium and small firms. There are some 
specific differences in the Australian data compared to international results. When we compare 
our results to the results of Seyhun (1986) we find similar level of statistical and economic 
significance and difference between large and small stocks. One of the main results from 
Seyhun (1986) was that after transaction costs, outside investors could not make profits on their 
information about insider trades. The results in this paper contributes to the literature by 
showing that in today’s equity markets, with significantly lower transaction costs and higher 
turnover rates, insider profits are still significant, and inside information is still incorporated 
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into prices of Australian equities with a delay. Our results also support Jeng, Metrick and 
Zechkhauser (2003), who find that the returns earned by insiders themselves are significant 
when close attention is paid to measuring these appropriately. Finally we extend the findings 
in previous Australian research into the most recent years (Brown, Foo and Watson (2003), 
Hodgson and van Praag (2006) and Uylangco, Easton and Faff (2010)). 
The outcomes presented in this paper emphasise that reported legal insider trading action 
has a significant impact on returns, and that investors and money managers need to pay close 
attention to the actions of corporate directors, particularly in larger firms where insider activity 
may be harder to detect. Investors and regulators can conduct an analysis similar to ours using 
real time data by updating their database on insider trading with from the public records. 
Future research (and future extensions of this paper) can further contribute to our 
understanding of the impact of transaction costs, both explicit (fees) and implicit (bid-ask 
spreads and market impact) on insider performance. The purpose of such analysis would further 
validate our finding that insider trading profits are still of sufficient significance and persistence 
to be beneficial for those who follow insiders. The results presented in this paper will be 
particularly useful for investors that wish to increase the quality of the information used in their 
investment allocation and timing decisions. The results are also important for regulators 
promoting a market with the highest possible level of informed prices. A market that optimises 
the way information is reflected in prices is in our view a more liquid and resilient market with 
higher integrity and fairness. 
   
23 
 
 
References 
Aspris, A., S. Foley, and A. Frino. 2014. Does Insider Trading Explain Price Run-up ahead of 
Takeover Announcements? Australian Evidence. Accounting and Finance, 54, 25–45. 
Bhattacharya, U., and H. Daouk, 2002, The world price of insider trading, Journal of Finance, 57, 
75-108. 
Berkman, H., Koch, P. and Westerholm, J., 2014, Informed Trading through the Accounts of 
Children, Journal of Finance, 69, 363-404. 
Berkman, H., Koch, P. and Westerholm, J., 2015a, Inside the director network: When insiders trade 
outside stocks, under review Review of Financial Studies. 
Berkman, H., Koch, P. and Westerholm, J., 2015b, Brokers’ personal trading: Informed investing or 
front-running, Working paper. 
Brown,  P., M. Foo, I. Watson, 2003, Trading by insiders in Australia: evidence on the profitability 
of directors' trades, Company and Securities Law Journal, 21, 248–261. 
Chang, Millicent, and Iain Watson., 2015, Delayed disclosure of insider trades: Incentives for and 
indicators of future performance? Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35, 182-197/  
Cohen, L., C. Malloy, and L. Pomorski, 2012, Decoding inside information, Journal of Finance, 67, 
1009-1043. 
Cukurova S., 2014, What Do Outside Directors Learn around Annual Meetings? Evidence from 
Insider Trading’, Aalto University Working paper. 
Finnerty, J. E., 1976, Insiders and Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance, 31, 1141–1148. 
Hodgson, A. and B. Van Praag, 2006, Informed trading by corporate insiders based on accounting 
accruals: Forecasting economic performance, Accounting and Finance, 46, 819-842. 
Jaffe, J. F., 1974, Special Information and Insider Trading,” Journal of Business, 47, 410–428. 
Jeng, Metrick and Zechkhauser, 2003, Estimating the Returns to Insider Trading: A Performance-
Evaluation Perspective, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 453-471. 
Lakonishok, J., and I. Lee, 2001, Are Insider Trades Informative? Review of Financial Studies, 14, 
79–111. 
24 
 
 
McInish, T. H., A. Frino A., and F. Sensenbrenner, 2011, Strategic illegal insider trading prior to 
price sensitive announcements. Journal of Financial Crime, 18, 247-253. 
Mehta, N.M., D.M. Reeb, W. Zhao W., Shadow Trading: Do Insiders Exploit Private Information 
About Stakeholders, National University of Singapore Working paper. 
John, K., and L. H. P. Lang, 1991, Insider trading around dividend announcements: theory and 
evidence, Journal of Finance, 46, 1361-1389. 
Meulbroek, L. K, 1992, An empirical analysis of illegal insider trading, Journal of Finance, 47, 
1661-1699. 
Ravina, E., and P. Sapienza, 2010, What do Independent Directors Know? Evidence from Their 
Trading, Review of Financial Studies, 23, 962–1003. 
Rogoff, D. L., 1964, The forecasting properties of insiders’ transactions, Journal of Finance,  
Rozeff, M. S., and M. A. Zaman. 1988. Market Efficiency and Insider Trading: New Evidence. 
Journal of Business 61(1):25–44.19, : 697-698. 
Seyhun, H. N., 1986, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 16, 189–212. 
Tomasic, R., and B. Pentony, 1991, Casino capitalism?: insider trading in Australia. Australian 
Institute of Criminology. 
Uylangco, K., S. Easton, R. Faff, 2010, The equity and efficiency of the Australian share market with 
respect to director trading, Accounting Research Journal, 23, pp. 5–19. 
 
  
25 
 
 
Figure 1  
Cumulative Daily Average Abnormal Returns around the Insider Trading Day 
This figure presents the cumulative daily average abnormal returns (CAARs) from 199 days before to 300 days 
after the insider trading day for a portfolio that consists 2094 firms traded by insiders during 2005/12/08 to 
2015/02/12. The CARs are separated by sale and buy transactions as well as overall sample that includes both buy 
and sale transactions, and illustrated for all stocks, small, medium and large stocks. For the overall sample (which 
includes both buy and sell transactions), the abnormal returns for sales are multiplied by minus one before 
averaging across all transactions to compute CAARs. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: CAARs for buy transactions Panel B: CAARs for sale transactions 
Panel C: CAARs for overall sample (buy and sale transactions) 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports cross-sectional average summary statistics for the sample of director insider trades in their own 
firm stock on the ASX from 2005/12/08 to 2015/02/12 and comparable market statistics for the same period (Total 
volume of shares traded in the market). 
 
 Director Insider Trades All Large Medium Small 
Market Capitalisation-Mean (in $million)  682.4 1992.5 44.9 9.8 
Market Capitalisation-Median (in $million) 38.51 336.27 38.51 9.63 
Number of firms 2,094 698 698 698 
Number of insider transactions 21,387 8,504 6,992 5,891 
Proportion of insider transactions 100% 39.8% 32.7% 27.5% 
Ratio of buy to sale insider transactions 1.6 0.75 1.69 2.64 
     
Market Related Statistics     
Total number of transactions in the market 3,702,817 1,811,064 964,261 927,492 
Proportion insider trades to all trades 0.58% 0.47% 0.73% 0.64% 
Days with insider trades per year per stock     
     Mean 3.10 3.23 3.07 2.94 
     Min 1 1 1 1 
     Max 40 40 33 32 
Number of insider trades on above days     
     Mean 6.25 6.26 6.51 5.91 
     Min 1 1 1 1 
     Max 40 40 33 32 
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Table 2 
Performance of Insiders (Cumulative daily Average Abnormal Returns) 
 
This table reports the mean and median of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) over different time frames after insiders trade shares of their own firm and across 
different size groups. In each panel, first (second) column present the characteristics of CAARs after insiders buy (sell). Third column reports the CAARs for the overall sample 
of transactions that includes both buy and sale. The whole sample consists 2094 firms traded by insiders during 2005/12/08 to 2015/02/12.The t-statistics are computed using 
Newey-West (1987) method with four lags. *, **, *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) 0.0055** 2.43 -0.0011 1983  -0.004 -0.5 -0.0109 951  0.0026 0.67 
(1,10 0.004 1.37 -0.0053 1983  -0.0072 -0.8 -0.0193 951  0.0022 0.51 
(1,20) -0.0052 -1.28 -0.0145 1983  -0.0257*** -2.7 -0.0288 951  -0.0043 -0.87 
(1,60) -0.0239*** -2.87 -0.0472 1982  -0.0815*** -6.92 -0.0833 948  -0.013 -1.56 
(1,120) -0.0277 -1.48 -0.0802 1963  -0.0996*** -4.52 -0.1279 932  -0.0137 -0.76 
(1,250) -0.051* -1.91 -0.1348 1909   -0.1142* -1.84 -0.2041 892   -0.0356 -1.41 
 
Panel B: Small Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) 0.0004 0.07 -0.0084 665  -0.0193 -1.26 -0.0222 233  0.0012 0.21 
(1,10 -0.0074 -1.13 -0.0188 665  -0.0127 -0.63 -0.0374 233  -0.0065 -0.93 
(1,20) -0.0225*** -2.69 -0.0421 665  -0.054** -2.41 -0.0736 233  -0.0177** -2.08 
(1,60) -0.0738*** -5.09 -0.1106 665  -0.1631*** -5.89 -0.1868 231  -0.0519*** -3.73 
(1,120) -0.0677 -1.32 -0.1945 662  -0.153** -2.32 -0.3129 226  -0.0485 -0.98 
(1,250) -0.1741*** -3.02 -0.3402 640   -0.0905 -0.53 -0.4540 212   -0.1593** -2.56 
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Table 2, continued 
 
Panel C: Medium Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) 0.0091*** 3.09 0.0019 666  0.0137 0.63 -0.0112 308  0.0002 0.02 
(1,10) 0.0086** 2.04 -0.0032 666  0.0064 0.28 -0.0214 308  0.0027 0.27 
(1,20) -0.0073 -1.27 -0.0199 666  -0.0066 -0.28 -0.0385 308  -0.009 -0.86 
(1,60) -0.0159 -0.94 -0.0590 665  -0.0622** -2.38 -0.1107 307  -0.0077 -0.43 
(1,120) -0.0374** -2.04 -0.0984 660  -0.1021** -2.46 -0.1775 301  -0.0165 -0.84 
(1,250) -0.0264 -0.59 -0.1676 642   -0.1315 -0.91 -0.3372 285   0.001 0.03 
 
Panel D: Large Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) 0.007*** 3.28 0.0019 652  -0.0087*** -3.75 -0.0085 410  0.0064*** 3.66 
(1,10) 0.0146** 2.2 0.0004 652  -0.0143*** -4.38 -0.0142 410  0.0105*** 3.19 
(1,20) 0.019* 1.77 -0.0081 652  -0.0239*** -5.51 -0.0186 410  0.0142** 2.41 
(1,60) 0.0247** 2 -0.0089 641  -0.05*** -4.89 -0.0521 410  0.0216** 2.22 
(1,120) 0.0234* 1.92 -0.0094 641  -0.068*** -4.21 -0.0724 405  0.0251** 2.38 
(1,250) 0.0494 1.58 -0.0141 627   -0.1144*** -4.66 -0.1111 395   0.0519* 1.9 
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Table 3 
Performance of Insiders (Calandar Time Portfolio Retruns) 
 
This table reports the monthly performance of buy and sale portfolios constructed based on net trade of insiders 
over the prior three months. At the beginning of each month, we assign each stock into the insider buy (sale) 
portfolio if insiders for the particular stock are net buyer (seller) of that stock over the previous three months. We 
calculate the equally weighted portfolio returns in each month and rebalance the porftfolios on monthly basis. Ave 
Return is the time series average returns of portfolios. Fama–French Alpha and Carhart Alpha are the intercepts 
estimated from the time-series regression of portfolio returns against the Fama–French three factors and also the 
four factors comprising the three Fama–French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, respectively. All 
values are in percentage. T-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for HAC using Newey-West (1987) method 
with four lags. *, **, *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  Buy Portfolio  Sell Portfolio 
Size Group  Ave Return  Alpha  Ave Return  Alpha 
  Fama-French Carhart  Fama-French Carhart 
All stocks  0.11***  -0.28*** -0.28***  0.09  -0.33*** -0.32*** 
  (9.93)  (-24.34) (-24.41)  (1.47)  (5.13) (-5.03) 
           
Small  0.19***  -0.19*** -0.19***  0.02**  -0.28*** -0.27*** 
  (7.77)  (-7.74) (-7.86)  (2.06)  (-5.22) (-5.08) 
           
Medium  0.10***  -0.30*** -0.30***  0.03  -0.37*** -0.37*** 
  (94.40)  (-13.65) (-13.65)  (1.12)  (-13.94) (-13.95) 
           
Large  0.06***  -0.32*** -0.32***  0.10**  -0.38*** -0.37*** 
  (4.28)  (-23.48) (-23.56)  (2.29)  (-29.57) (-29.38) 
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Table 4 
Determinants of Insiders Performance 
 
This table reports the determinants of daily cumulative abnormal returns after insider trades. The independent 
variables are dummy variables for sales transactions, S, the natural logarithm of the daily close price of the firm, 
Log V, the log of dollar volume of insider trading (defined as the product of VWAP and volume of shares traded 
by the insider) Log TV, and the log of the portion of shares of the firms traded by insiders, Log PV. T-statistics 
reported in parenthesis are computed using Newey-West (1987) method with four lags. *, **, *** indicate 
significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Short-run (10 days after the trade) 
 
    Model 
Size Group Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
All Stocks Intercept 0.0020 -0.0086*** -0.0031 0.0302*** -0.0349*** 0.0192*** 
  (1.27) (-4.77) (-0.41) (4.33) (-4.26) (2.59) 
 S 0.0103**      
  (2.14)      
 LogV  -0.0167***   -0.0182*** -0.0128*** 
   (-9.37)   (-9.91) (-6.26) 
 LogTV   0.0008  0.0025***  
    (1.05)  (3.28)  
 LogPV    0.0035***  0.0030*** 
          (4.12)   (3.41) 
Large Stocks Intercept 0.0062*** 0.0170*** 0.0034 0.0198*** 0.0017 0.0305*** 
  (4.29) (8.48) (0.42) (2.61) (0.22) (3.87) 
 S 0.0030      
  (0.82)      
 LogV  -0.0140***   -0.0151*** -0.0130*** 
   (-6.29)   (-6.60) (-5.17) 
 LogTV   0.0003  0.0015**  
    (0.46)  (1.98)  
 LogPV    0.0014*  0.0014* 
         (1.78)   (1.77) 
Mid-Cap  Intercept 0.0043* -0.0144*** 0.0128 0.0251* -0.0275 0.0033 
Stocks  (1.80) (-2.74) (0.80) (1.73) (-1.50) (0.19) 
 S 0.0108      
  (1.34)      
 LogV  -0.0146***   -0.0153*** -0.0108*** 
   (-4.48)   (-4.53) (-2.72) 
 LogTV   -0.0006  0.0012  
    (-0.37)  (0.74)  
 LogPV    0.0026  0.0016 
         (1.33)   (0.74) 
Small Stocks Intercept -0.0073* -0.0619*** -0.0383** 0.0628*** -0.1322*** 0.0277 
  (-1.69) (-5.54) (-2.03) (3.73) (-5.46) (1.19) 
 S 0.0367*      
  (1.94)      
 LogV  -0.0228***   -0.0260*** -0.0145*** 
   (-5.51)   (-6.14) (-3.09) 
 LogTV   0.0040*  0.0069***  
    (1.94)  (3.25)  
 LogPV    0.0108***  0.0107*** 
          (4.47)   (4.06) 
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Panel B: Determinants of Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Long-run (120 days after the trade) 
 
    Model 
Size Group Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
All Stocks Intercept -0.0450*** -0.1549*** -0.0576 0.1168*** -0.3459*** 0.0384 
  (-6.89) (-15.99) (-1.44) (3.83) (-7.99) (1.17) 
 S 0.1135***      
  (5.58)      
 LogV  -0.1565***   -0.1647*** -0.0964*** 
   (-16.33)   (-16.81) (-10.48) 
 LogTV   0.0027  0.0179***  
    (0.68)  (4.53)  
 LogPV    0.0202***  0.0184*** 
         (5.43)   (4.77) 
Large Stocks Intercept 0.0059 0.0906*** -0.0189 0.1168*** -0.0324 0.1963*** 
  (1.06) (11.89) (-0.63) (4.06) (-1.10) (6.57) 
 S 0.0400***      
  (2.87)      
 LogV  -0.1083***   -0.1154*** -0.0977*** 
   (-12.69)   (-13.52) (-10.14) 
 LogTV   0.0028  0.0115***  
    (1.06)  (4.23)  
 LogPV    0.0112***  0.0111*** 
         (3.65)   (3.60) 
Mid-Cap  Intercept -0.0517*** -0.2829*** -0.0470 0.0640 -0.5203*** -0.1247** 
Stocks  (-3.93) (-9.40) (-0.51) (1.34) (-4.99) (-2.21) 
 S 0.1936***      
  (4.35)      
 LogV  -0.1750***   -0.1824*** -0.0986*** 
   (-9.28)   (-9.43) (-7.45) 
 LogTV   0.0016  0.0225**  
    (0.17)  (2.41)  
 LogPV    0.0156**  0.0096 
         (2.43)   (1.40) 
Small Stocks Intercept -0.1110*** -0.5929*** -0.1382 0.2182** -0.8592*** 0.0169 
  (-7.23) (-9.37) (-1.30) (2.34) (-6.28) (0.12) 
 S 0.2280***      
  (3.40)      
 LogV  -0.1880***   -0.2001*** -0.0877*** 
   (-7.97)   (-8.26) (-3.09) 
 LogTV   0.0038  0.0261**  
    (0.32)  (2.20)  
 LogPV    0.0525***  0.0587*** 
          (3.94)   (3.78) 
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Table 5 
Number of Insider’s Transactions before Reporting to ASX. 
 
This table reports the number of insider’s transactions (buy and sale) from 2005/12/08 to 2015/02/12, grouped by 
the number of calendar days between the insider trading day and the day that insider’s reports are received by 
ASX and immediately becomes public.  The number of transactions is presented in size groups. The percentage 
of total number of transactions in each size category is reported in brackets.  
 
    Number of transactions from trade day to report day 
Size Group 
Total number 
of 
transactions 
Delay less 
than or equal 
to 3 days 
Delay 
between 3 
and 5 days 
Delay 
between 5 
and 7 days 
Delay 
between 7 
and 10 days 
Delay 
more than 
10 days 
All Stocks 21,387 
12,650 3,845 3,135 463 1,294 
[59%] [18%] [15%] [2%] [6%] 
Large Stocks 8,504 
4,951 1,531 1,387 168 467 
[58%] [18%] [16%] [2%] [6%] 
Medium Stocks 6,992 
4,241 1,239 913 168 431 
[61%] [18%] [13%] [2%] [6%] 
Small Stocks 5,891 
3,458 1,075 835 127 396 
[59%] [18%] [14%] [2%] [7%] 
 
33 
 
 
Table 6 
 Gain (Loss) of Outsiders after Insider’s Report Submitted to ASX 
 
This table reports daily average of cumulative abnormal returns for outsiders after the insider’s trades become public. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West (1987) 
method with four lags. *, **, *** indicate significances at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: All Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) -0.0003 -0.21 -0.0045 1993  -0.0109*** -2.71 -0.0099 954  0.0023 1.46 
(1,10) -0.002 -0.73 -0.0087 1993  -0.0185*** -4.01 -0.0194 954  0.0012 0.44 
(1,20) -0.009** -2.32 -0.0176 1993  -0.0362*** -6.56 -0.0261 954  -0.0021 -0.59 
(1,60) -0.0251*** -2.97 -0.0483 1991  -0.0875*** -9.59 -0.0784 952  -0.0092 -1.17 
(1,120) -0.0327* -1.75 -0.0820 1973  -0.1027*** -5.07 -0.1298 934  -0.0127 -0.71 
(1,250) -0.0483* -1.81 -0.1356 1919   -0.122** -2 -0.2089 896   -0.0266 -1.06 
 
Panel B: Small Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) -0.0028 -0.72 -0.0123 670  -0.0202 -1.38 -0.0191 231  0.0022 0.59 
(1,10) -0.0123** -2.46 -0.0251 670  -0.0392** -2.53 -0.0466 231  -0.006 -1.32 
(1,20) -0.0234*** -3 -0.0450 670  -0.0796*** -4.48 -0.0829 231  -0.0103 -1.41 
(1,60) -0.0709*** -4.57 -0.1194 670  -0.1685*** -6.93 -0.1957 230  -0.0448*** -3.08 
(1,120) -0.0722 -1.43 -0.1985 666  -0.1458** -2.26 -0.2892 224  -0.0491 -1.01 
(1,250) -0.1631*** -2.85 -0.3204 644   -0.1003 -0.6 -0.4394 211   -0.1436** -2.33 
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Table 6, continued 
 
Panel C: Medium Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) -0.0006 -0.22 -0.0056 669  -0.01* -1.95 -0.0145 309  0.0018 0.77 
(1,10) -0.0037 -1.05 -0.0112 669  -0.0131* -1.83 -0.0241 309  -0.0006 -0.18 
(1,20) -0.0157*** -2.86 -0.0225 669  -0.0278*** -3.2 -0.0297 309  -0.0078 -1.5 
(1,60) -0.0222 -1.32 -0.0587 668  -0.0894*** -5.51 -0.1101 308  -0.0025 -0.16 
(1,120) -0.0472** -2.5 -0.0975 664  -0.1231*** -3.6 -0.1770 302  -0.0136 -0.77 
(1,250) -0.0283 -0.63 -0.1764 646   -0.15 -1.06 -0.3343 286   0.0112 0.35 
 
Panel D: Large Stocks 
 
                    CARs (Buy)   CARs (Sell)   CARs (Overall Sample)  
Event period Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat Median N  Mean t-stat 
(1,5) 0.0024 1.33 0.0001 654  -0.0064*** -2.96 -0.0048 414  0.0029* 1.79 
(1,10) 0.0102* 1.84 0.0010 654  -0.0109*** -3.54 -0.0095 414  0.0105** 2 
(1,20) 0.0128* 1.96 -0.0041 654  -0.0184*** -4.27 -0.0174 414  0.0122** 2.07 
(1,60) 0.0188* 1.78 -0.0056 653  -0.041*** -4.12 -0.0441 414  0.0204** 2.11 
(1,120) 0.0232* 1.82 -0.0108 643  -0.064*** -4.01 -0.0667 408  0.0259** 2.34 
(1,250) 0.0487 1.54 -0.0225 629   -0.1133*** -4.69 -0.0948 399   0.053* 1.91 
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Table 7 
Summary of the Literature on Insider Trading Returns 
This table reports a comparison across major international studies and all Australian studies with comparable results. We report the average abnormal annual return 
for insider purchases, i.e. the average return on the stocks above the market over one year after an insider trade was reported. 
*) we have implied this combined effect from their reported executive and independent director returns, **) buy portfolio following director trades based on accounting 
accruals, ***) abnormal returns over 10 days post director trade, ****) for large stock sample 
Summary of Studies of Insider Trading Returns           
      
Authors Publication Year Data Sample Market Main Finding Interpretation 
    Abnormal Annual Return Insider Purchases 
      
Jaffe 1974 1962-1968 US 7.0% Significant 
Finnerty 1976 1969-1972 US 4.8-8.3% Significant 
Seyhun 1985 1975-1981 US 4.3% Not Significant 
Jeng, Metrick and Zechkhauser 2003 1976-1996 US 6.0% Significant 
Ravina and Sapienza 2010 1986-2003 US 12.8%*) Significant 
      
Brown, Foo and Watson 2003 1996-2000 Australia 4.4% Not Significant 
Hodgson and van Praag 2006 1996-2003 Australia 4.3%**) Significant 
Uylangco, Easton and Faff 2010 2005-2007 Australia 0.4%***) Significant 
Berkman, Bradrania, Viljoen and Westerholm  2016 2005-2015 Australia 4.9%****) Significant 
            
 
